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INFORMALITY AS A BILATERAL 
ASSURANCE MECHANISM 
Comments on Ronald Mann's 
'The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions' 
A very Wiener Katz* 
Ronald Mann's study of documentary defects in the presentation 
of commercial letters of credit1 is a valuable contribution to the 
commercial law literature in at least three respects. First, it offers a 
detailed and thorough empirical survey of an important though 
specialized aspect of commercial practice. Mann collected and coded 
a data sample of 500 randomly selected letter-of-credit transactions, 
personally evaluating each transaction to determine whether the 
documentary presentation by the beneficiary of the letter of credit 
(i.e., the seller) complied with the letter's formal terms. Then, for each 
case in which he found one or more documentary defects, Mann went 
on to classify· the defects and to evaluate their commercial and 
practical significance. He also measured how quickly and readily the 
issuing bank and the applicant (i.e., the buyer) responded to - and 
ultimately waived - the defects, in addition to collecting various other 
information about the transaction and the parties involved. The 
creation of this data set required significant time, effort, and both 
professional and scholarly judgment; and the result is a level and 
quality of information that goes substantially beyond the qualitative 
information gleaned from his interviews with bank officers, not to 
mention the anecdotal information that motivated the study in the first 
place. 
Second, Mann has not just produced a dry collection of business 
facts. Rather, in showing that the beneficiaries of letters of credit 
routinely fail to present documents that comply with the terms of the 
underlying letter and that the applicants and issuing banks just as 
routinely waive the resulting defects, he has convincingly documented 
an important and counterintuitive empirical regularity about 
commercial letters of credit - one that substantially undercuts the 
conventional teaching in the area that the purpose of the letter of 
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law (avkatz@law.columbia.edu). I 
am grateful to Lisa Bernstein and Clay Gillette for helpful discussions, and to Ronald Mann 
and the editors of the University of Michigan Law Review for organizing the Symposium on 
Empirical Research in Commercial Transactions for which these comments were prepared. 
1. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 2494 (2000) [hereinafter Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit]. 
2554 
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credit is to provide the beneficiary with a guaranty of payment that is 
legally enforceable against the issuing bank. His findings are striking, 
provocative, and persuasive enough to demand explanation and, thus, 
to force a revision of the conventional scholarly wisdom in this area. 
Third, Mann has put forward a theoretical account of letters of 
credit, grounded in the modem economics of information and based 
on his prior work in other areas of commercial law, that is both more 
nuanced and conceptually more sophisticated than is the conventional 
scholarly view. His explanation is that the value of letters of credit in 
assuring beneficiaries of payment does not lie primarily in their legal 
significance, but rather in their practical significance. More 
specifically, the willingness of a bank to issue a letter of credit serves 
as a credible signal, enforced by an implicit reputational bond, of the 
issuer's private information that the applicant is a reliable creditor; 
and this signal is more important to the beneficiary in practical terms 
than is any right to collect directly from the bank. To use Mann's own 
terminology, the letter of credit is primarily a verification institution, 
not a guaranty institution.2 This explanation is creative, interesting, 
and as far as I know, original. It may be that Mann's explanation, as 
he suggests at various points, will be regarded as old news by 
practicing commercial specialists in the letter-of-credit area. Even if 
this is so, however, and even if his explanation is incomplete or 
incorrect, he has significantly advanced the state of the scholarly 
literature on this topic. 
In these comments, I argue that the theoretical account of letters of 
credit that Mann offers, while instructive and suggestive, is indeed 
incomplete. In particular, Mann's theory does not explain why parties 
contracting at a distance would want to use a commercial letter of 
credit as their mechanism for verifying information relevant to the 
extension of credit, as opposed to some other device. Similarly, his 
account does not explain why, given that the parties have chosen to 
use a letter of credit to signal the buyer's reliability, they would avoid 
the presumably stronger signal of making the letter legally binding. 
Indeed, as Mann himself tells us, if the parties' main purpose is to 
provide the seller with assurance that the buyer will pay, there are 
easier and cheaper means through which to provide such assurance. 
Thus, his information-verification theory fails to explain all of the facts 
he uncovers in his empirical research, and to the extent it is consistent 
with his findings, it would be equally consistent with other findings if 
not more so. 
The reason why Mann's explanation is incomplete, I also argue, is 
that he focuses on only half of the incentive problem inherent in the 
stereotypical commercial letter-of-credit transaction. When parties 
2 See generally Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, f!>7 
GEO. L.J. 2225 (1999) [hereinafter Mann, Verification Institutions]. 
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deal at a distance, there is risk on both sides. The seller faces the risk 
that she will ship goods for which the buyer will not pay, leaving her 
with the relatively ineffective remedy of a lawsuit in a distant and 
unfamiliar jurisdiction; this is the problem on which Mann focuses. 
But the buyer faces the corresponding risk that he will pay for goods 
that are defective or that the seller does not even ship.3 Either party 
could reduce or even eliminate this risk by insisting that the other 
party perform first; for instance, the seller could insist that the buyer 
prepay, or the buyer could insist that the seller ship on open account 
and that payment be due only after the buyer is satisfied that the 
goods conform to the underlying contract. Intermediate arrangements 
will give less protection to one party and more to the other. But there 
is no arrangement that will provide complete assurance to both; the 
difficulty lies in the very fact that the parties deal at a distance, which 
both makes it impossible for them to perform simultaneously, and 
renders the usual legal remedy for breach of contract - a lawsuit for 
damages or specific performance - ineffective in practical terms. 
What Mann omits, in his focus on the seller's need to verify the 
reliability of her buyer, is that the commercial letter of credit is a 
bilateral assurance mechanism - one that, more or less, splits the 
difference between prepayment and shipment on open account. When 
the bilateral nature of the risk inherent in long-distance transactions is 
taken into account, the use of letters of credit, as well as the fact that 
in most instances they are honored despite technical noncompliance 
with their documentary conditions, becomes substantially more 
understandable. 
1. WHY USE A LEITER OF CREDIT AT ALL? 
As a vast theoretical and empirical literature in law and in 
economics makes plain, imperfect information is a primary 
institutional consideration in credit markets. According to the 
standard economic theory of risk bearing, creditors who lack 
individualized information about their debtors' risk profiles or post­
credit behavior will be unable to price credit terms correctly or 
provide incentives for optimal precaution and risk taking by debtors 
over the life of the loan. As a result, the price of credit will generally 
include a premium for anticipated suboptimal behavior by the debtor 
(moral hazard) as well as a cross-subsidy from low-risk to high-risk 
debtors that inefficiently discourages the former from applying for 
credit in the first place (adverse selection). These informational 
transaction costs arise not just in explicit credit markets, but in any 
3. In order to avoid ambiguity, when discussing generic transactions, I adopt the 
convention of referring to buyers, letter-of-credit applicants, and other debtors with male 
pronouns; sellers, letter-of-credit beneficiaries, and other creditors with female pronouns; 
and banks and other intermediaries with neuter pronouns. 
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contractual relationship that includes an implicit credit element - that 
is, in any contract where performance is not completely simultaneous.4 
Reducing such costs to manageable proportions, accordingly, will in 
many instances be crucial to the success of the overall contract. 
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are likely to 
be especially significant when parties contract at a distance. The 
difficulty of verifying information about a far-off and unfamiliar 
location, organized according to local conventions and possibly in a 
different language; the problems of collecting at a distance and 
navigating a foreign legal system; and the relative infrequency of such 
transactions, malting it difficult to cover the overhead costs of 
investigation and enforcement or to establish a credible business 
reputation, all combine to make reliance on ex post legal enforcement 
an especially cumbersome tool to ensure compliance with contractual 
obligations. Thus Mann's observation that long-distance sellers would 
have special concerns about the reliability and creditworthiness of 
their buyers, and would accordingly have special need for devices that 
address these concerns, is both intuitive and empirically plausible. 
AB both the practice of and the literature on commercial 
transactions attests, however, and as Mann himself has documented 
more fully in another context, a host of legal and commercial 
institutions are available to serve this accreditation function.5 One 
such institution is secured credit, under which the debtor offers 
specific property as collateral for his loan, thus providing a source of 
funds out of which the creditor may satisfy her debt in the event of 
default, as well as, under most systems of secured credit, a relatively 
expedited process for collection.6 Another such institution is the 
contractual guaranty, under which a third party undertakes a 
secondary obligation to pay the debt if the primary debtor does not.7 
A third device is the posting of a bond, to be forfeited to the creditor, 
to a third party, or even destroyed in the event of breach or other 
debtor misbehavior.8 A fourth is the use of contractual intermediaries 
4. See generally Y. Kotowitz, Moral Hazard, in 3 THE 'NEW P ALGRA VE: A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 549 (J. Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); Charles Wilson, Adverse 
Selection, in 1 THE NEW P ALGRA VE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 32 {J. Eatwell et al. 
eds., 1987). 
5. See generally Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 2. 
6. See, e.g., Ronald Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 
GEO. LJ. 1 {1997); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 901 {1986); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of 
Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of 
Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 {1992). 
7. See generally Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 47 {1999). 
8. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 730 {1989) [hereinafter Scott, Coercive Creditor Remedies] (applying theory 
to context of debtor-creditor law in particular); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible 
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who have some link to the unknown debtor, whether through past 
transactional experience, common ethnic identity, or membership in a 
trade association, and who themselves are known or who have an 
established commercial reputation.9 And a fifth alternative is the 
direct acquisition of knowledge, whether through personal investment, 
gossip, or a direct purchase from a specialist in the collection and 
processing of commercial information, such as Dun and Bradstreet or 
other credit reporting agencies. 
Each of these alternatives alleviates the problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection in various ways: by lowering the creditor's cost 
of collection (secured credit, third-party guaranties), raising the cost to 
the debtor of engaging in suboptimal behavior (bonds, collateral), or 
signaling private information of the debtor and third parties (all of the 
above, in that a party's willingness to assume special risk in the event 
of default credibly reveals his or its belief that such risk is low). They 
can be used separately or in concert, as when a applicant for an 
automobile loan is asked to provide credit references, to make a 
substantial down payment, to grant the lender a security interest in the 
car, to sign a promissory note, and in some cases to provide a co­
signer. Most of them are sufficiently flexible, furthermore, so as to 
accommodate a variety of practical and legal forms. For instance, a 
bond can be posted in the form of out-of-pocket funds (as with a 
landlord's security deposit or a down payment), of a relationship­
specific physical asset the value of which will be destroyed if the 
contract is discontinued or not renewed (as when a railroad builds a 
special spur to reach a particular mine or wellhead), of deferred 
compensation or future expected profits (as when an employer offers a 
pension for long-term service or a commercial buyer holds out the 
prospect of repeat business as a reward for high quality), or of 
reputation in the relevant commercial community (as when breach of 
contract can get one gossiped about or expelled from a trade 
association). 
Given this rich variety of alternative verification and guaranty 
devices, therefore, a long-distance seller's need for information 
regarding her buyer does not explain, let alone predict, the use of the 
commercial letter of credit in particular. In order to provide such an 
Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) 
(developing general theory of bond posting). 
9. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138-143 (1992) (detailing the role 
of trade associations and commercial experience in private contractual enforcement); Janet 
T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional 
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981) (detailing the informational role 
of ethnic middlemen); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in 
Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993) (detailing the 
same with historical discussion of reputation-supporting social networks in 11th-century 
Europe). 
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explanation, one would have to show that the letter of credit is 
cheaper than its alternatives, more reliable, or both. And in this 
regard, Mann's evidence is neither apposite nor helpful. Because his 
data look only at letters of credit, and are drawn from the files of the 
issuing banks rather than from the files of the buyer-applicants or 
seller-beneficiaries, they cannot tell us how or why these buyers and 
sellers choose to use letters of credit rather than (or, in conjunction 
with) these other devices. 
More problematically, as Mann himself explains, the letter of credit 
is a relatively expensive verification device. Its price is typically set at 
a low but constant percentage of the amount at risk in the underlying 
sales transaction, which means that in large transactions the cost to the 
parties can reach thousands of dollars.10 In contrast, documents of title 
cost in the neighborhood of one-tenth that amount; and their price 
does not increase with the size of the transaction.11 A simple letter of 
reference printed on the bank's ordinary letterhead stationery would 
be even cheaper. Such alternate devices do not provide the seller with 
the same legal protections as does the letter of credit, to be sure, but 
under Mann's account it is bank reputation and not potential legal 
liability that does the informational work. There is no reason why 
credit references, title documents, or a host of other commercial 
documents regularly issued by banks could not carry (or could not be 
invested by the parties with) reputational weight in the same way that 
Mann suggests that letters of credit do and are.12 Why then, don't the 
parties use such cheap and readily available devices to provide the 
necessary verification, instead of the relatively expensive letter of 
credit? 
10. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra, note 1, at 2499. Though the payment 
for a letter of credit is formally paid by the buyer-applicant, its cost is ultimately shared 
between the buyer and seller. As a general matter, the surplus from exchange tends to be 
divided among contracting parties in proportion to their relative eagerness to enter into the 
bargain (and in competitive markets, by their elasticities of supply and demand). Any 
transaction costs from exchange, or efficiency gains or losses resulting from a change in legal 
regime, accordingly, will be shared by all. See generally Richard Craswell, Passing on the 
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 361 (1991). 
11. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2508. 
12. In a footnote to the latest version of his article, prepared after these comments were 
orally delivered, Mann acknowledges the theoretical force of this objection, but replies that 
the answer simply lies in the brute empirical fact that in the commercial world, letters of 
credit are understood to carry such weight and other documents are not See Mann, The 
Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2529 n.118. This response, however, obviously fails 
to explain why this conventional understanding exists, and why the understanding is not or 
could not be different, given the apparent availability of cheaper and equally effective 
methods for signaling the same information. 
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2. WHY USE A LEITER OF CREDIT AND THEN NOT MAKE IT 
LEGALLY BINDING? 
Conversely, Mann's information-verification theory does not 
explain why the parties would go to the expense of obtaining a letter 
of credit, and then write it and use it in a way that deprives it of its 
main formal advantage - that is, legal enforceability against the 
issuing bank. It is no answer to say that the parties are primarily 
interested in signaling the buyer's creditworthiness, and that the 
bank's mere willingness to issue a letter of credit provides such a 
signal. For the issuance of a letter of credit, backed up by legal 
liability on the part of the bank, would provide an even stronger 
signal. After all, the greater the penalty paid to the bank in the event 
of the buyer's default, the more credible is its representation that the 
chance of default is low. A bank that stands immediately to lose out of 
pocket the face value of a letter of credit, and not just in the long-run 
reputational sense, will have sharper incentives to monitor the buyer 
and ensure his compliance with the underlying sales contract. It will 
also have sharper incentives to screen buyers before agreeing to issue 
the letter in the first place. A bank that assumes both legal and 
reputational liability will have sharper incentives yet. 
If the response is that the seller does not need a perfect signal of 
the buyer's reliability, but only a sufficient one, the puzzle remains. 
For then the question becomes one of efficiency- how can the bank 
send a sufficiently reliable signal at lowest cost? And if we consider 
this question more closely, one finds again that a letter of credit 
backed up by reputational sanctions alone is a relatively expensive 
method of signaling. This is because the effectiveness of a 
reputational sanction requires that the party with the reputation (here, 
the bank) anticipate some supranormal profits (or more technically, 
economic rents) on its future operations. Otherwise, it has no 
incentive to spend resources or forego current profits to keep up its 
reputation. Indeed, the strength of a party's incentive to keep up its 
reputation, properly understood, is directly proportional to the 
expected future profits that serve as an effective bond for that 
reputation. 
To illustrate with a numerical example: consider a bank that issues 
a $1 million letter of credit. In order for reputation alone to provide 
an incentive to honor this obligation, the issuing bank must have at 
stake an anticipated $1 million of profits on future letter-of-credit 
transactions, else in the event of a dispute it would prefer to forego 
these future transactions and to default on its current obligation. This 
$1 million, furthermore, must take the form of supranormal profits, 
measured as a premium over the ordinary market return to capital. 
Otherwise the bank could simply recoup its losses by engaging in 
alternate financial or commercial activities. In order for it to 
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anticipate earning such profits in the future, the bank must plan to 
charge a price that exceeds its future expected costs of doing business, 
including normal returns to capital. Specifically, it must charge a 
markup that, when summed over all future transactions of the same 
type and discounted to present value, adds up to $1 million. The per­
unit markup will of course depend on the number of similar 
transactions it engages in, together with its discount rate and the 
fraction of business that lies at stake in a potential default. For 
instance, if the bank engages in 1,000 transactions of the same type per 
year, faces a discount rate of 10%, and anticipates that a single default 
would result in the loss of all future business of this sort, the required 
markup would be $100 per transaction.13 A larger issuer that engaged 
in 5,000 such transactions per year would only have to charge a 
markup of $20; while a smaller issuer spreading this cost over only 200 
transactions per year would have to charge a higher markup of $500. 
The assumption that a buyer's refusal to pay on a single letter of 
credit would cost the issuing bank its entire future letter-of-credit 
business, of course, is unrealistic. An alternative assumption of a 5% 
loss in future business (probably still too high, given the geographic 
separation of beneficiaries, the heterogeneity of buyers and sellers 
using the letter-of-credit device, the difficulty of determining the 
validity of the buyer's refusal in the absence of an authoritative public 
hearing, and the difficulty of allocating blame for the refusal between 
the buyer and the bank) would imply a markup of $2,000 for the 
medium-size issuer, 400 for the large issuer, and $10,000 for the small 
issuer. This is, recall, on a transaction that Mann tells us typically sells 
for around $2,500, so that if Mann's information is accurate, then a 
significant fraction of the cost of a letter of credit would have to 
consist of reputational rents. These calculations imply, somewhat 
implausibly, that the letter-of-credit divisions of commercial banks 
should earn profits well in excess of the normal economic return to 
capital. 
Compare this figure with the likely expected costs of enforcing a 
letter of credit through the judicial system. Taking a lawsuit all the 
way to final judicial disposition is not cheap, but most letters of credit 
never lead to any dispute, because the formalistic rules of letter-of­
credit law considerably streamline the resolution of any disputes that 
do arise, facilitating disposition or settlement at an early stage of the 
process.14 Most significant in this regard is what specialists in the area 
13. The calculation is as follows: profits of $100 per transaction times 1,000 transactions 
per year equals $100,000 per year. The present value of $100,000 per year indefinitely, at an 
interest rate of 10%, is $100,000/.10 = $1 million. 
14. Indeed, the formality of letter-of-credit law is regularly justified by experts in the 
field by the need to keep legal enforcement quick, cheap, and certain. See, e.g., JOHN F. 
DOLAN, THE LAW OF LEITERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY CREDITS 
(Warren et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991) at 2-55, 3-23, 3-24; U.C.C. § 5-103, cmt. 1 (1999). 
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refer to as the "independence principle": that is, liability under the 
letter of credit is both formally and substantively independent of the 
underlying contractual transaction it supports. Once the beneficiary 
demonstrates that she has presented conforming documents, 
accordingly, she is entitled to judgment. There is no need for her to 
demonstrate anything at all about the underlying contract; indeed, 
whether she is entitled to payment under the underlying contract is 
legally irrelevant.15 Similarly, the issuer's available defenses to liability 
are quite limited. An issuer or applicant can avoid paying claims that 
are materially fraudulent or based on forged documents, but the 
standards of proof of fraud are high.16 The current version of U.C.C. 
Article 5 formalizes the enforcement process even further, introducing 
several changes from prior law that are plainly intended to discourage 
interpretative disputes.17 As an illustrative calculation, then, even if as 
many as one out of every fifty letters of credit led to litigation 
(certainly too high a figure) and the costs of litigation were as high as 
$50,000 (possibly too low, but not that low if the case is settled or 
resolved on the pleadings), this would still imply an expected 
enforcement cost of only $1,000 per transaction - half of what we 
estimated was necessary to support an equivalent reputational 
sanction. 
Even if it turned out that reputational enforcement were generally 
cheaper than legal enforcement, furthermore, providing for both 
enforcement mechanisms would give the beneficiary an option to 
enforce with whatever sanction turned out ex post to be cheaper in the 
individual case. Like any other option, the availability of this option 
has positive value. Even if unused in the majority of cases, it would 
lower the beneficiary's expected costs of enforcing the bank's 
representations. 
15. This central aspect of the letter of credit is part of its legal definition. U.C.C. § 5-
102{a){10) {1999), defining "letter of credit," and § 5-102(a)(6), defining "document," 
provide that letters of credit can condition payment only on the presentation of specified 
records. Similarly, the Comptroller of the Currency's Interpretive Ruling 7.7016, 12 C.F.R. § 
7.7016 {1994), directs that "As a matter of sound banking practice, . . •  the bank must not be 
called upon to determine questions of fact or law at issue between the account party and the 
beneficiary." 
16. And these standards have been heightened by the 1995 revision to the statute. 
Compare revised § 5-109 (requiring "material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or 
applicant") with old § 5-114 (employing broader and vaguer standard of "fraud in the 
transaction"). 
17. See, e.g., new § 5-102{a)(7) {defining good faith as mere "honesty in fact," in contrast 
to the more equitable standard of "reasonable co=ercial standards of fair dealing" found 
in Article 2 and the proposed revision to Article 1); new § 5-lOS{a) (substituting a strict 
compliance principle for the doctrines of waiver and estoppel that would otherwise apply 
under section 1-103); new § 5-lOS{e) {making the question of the issuer's compliance \vith 
the standard practice of financial institutions a question for the court and not the jury); new § 
5-lll{a) {eliminating consequential damages and, more strikingly, the duty to mitigate 
damages); and new § 5-lll{e) (providing that courts must award attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party in any dispute that arises over the issuer's duty to pay). 
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If legal enforceability would lower the cost to the parties of sending 
a credible signal of the buyer's creditworthiness, why don't the parties 
structure letters of credit so that as a regular matter they are formally 
as well as practically binding on the issuer? The costs of document 
preparation is no answer, since the parties could if they wished write 
the documentary conditions more liberally, so as to cover the 
incomplete documents that Mann shows that beneficiaries routinely 
submit and issuers and applicants routinely honor. Under U.C.C. 
Article 5, it is left entirely to the parties to determine which specific 
documents might serve as a condition for drawing on a letter of credit; 
it is even possible to condition the payment upon the mere 
presentation of a draft together with the beneficiary's conclusory 
statement that payment is due (the so-called "clean" letter of credit). 
Why, instead, do the parties write the conditions strictly instead of 
liberally? 
That they do so deliberately seems inescapable. Mann's interview 
evidence backs up this conclusion, and for even more striking 
evidence, one need only look to the history of the recent revision of 
Article 5.18 There, not only did the official drafting committee and 
representatives of the letter-of-credit industry quickly agree on the 
importance of adopting a legal standard of strict compliance with 
documentary conditions, but the industry successfully lobbied the 
drafters to maintain and even to strengthen legal rules that maintained 
their discretion to insist on strict compliance with documentary 
conditions as a condition of liability, but waive it broadly in practice.19 
To summarize, the main theoretical puzzle raised by Mann's 
empirical findings remains. As he has shown, the parties to letters of 
credit go to substantial expense to cast their transactions in a legal 
form that, if designed appropriately and complied with by the seller, 
would provide a cheap and reliable method of enforcing the buyer's 
obligation to pay. But he also shows that in the majority of 
transactions the parties do not actually use this method to secure 
payment, instead preferring to rely on informal methods backed up by 
reputational sanctions. Mann's suggested explanation for his findings 
is that the parties are interested in verifying the buyer's reliability to 
the seller, not in legal liability per se. But his explanation turns out to 
be unconvincing once we recognize that a letter of credit backed up by 
reputational sanctions alone is likely to be a more expensive 
18. See James J. White, The Impact of Internationalization of Transnational Commercial 
Law: The Influence of International Practice on the Revision of Article 5 of the UCC, 6 Nw. J. 
INl"L L. & Bus. 189 (1995) (describing in particular the lobbying efforts of the U.S. Council 
on International Banking). 
19. See id. at 205, 208. According to White, the bankers were particularly concerned 
about the U.C.C.'s duty of good faith, which they feared would bind them to exercise their 
discretion to waive strict compliance consistently across cases, or to pay when documents 
substantially {but not strictly) conformed. 
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verification device than is either a lesser document backed up by the 
same reputational sanctions, or the same letter of credit backed up by 
legal sanctions. Thus, assuming they are economically rational, buyers 
and sellers who go to the expense of purchasing letters of credit must 
be buying something more than verification of the buyer's reliability. 
What, then, are they buying? 
3. THE PROBLEM OF BILATERAL INCENTIVES IN LONG-DISTANCE 
TRANSACTIONS 
As I have already indicated, the answer likely lies in the bilateral 
nature of the incentive and informational problems facing long­
distance buyers and sellers. Just as the seller is worried about the 
buyer's performance so is the buyer worried about the seller's. Just as 
the seller finds it difficult to acquire reliable credit information about 
an unknown customer in a distant location, and wishes to avoid the 
burdens of litigation in a foreign jurisdiction, so does the buyer. Thus, 
the buyer and the seller have similar need for verification of each 
other's contractual reliability. 
If the parties arranged for prepayment by the buyer, or if they used 
a letter of credit with minimal documentary conditions, the seller 
would have little reason to worry about the buyer's performance, but 
the buyer would have significantly greater reason to worry about the 
seller's. Conversely, if the parties arranged for shipment on account, 
or relied entirely on the reputational interests of the buyer's bank to 
ensure buyer performance, the buyer would have greater protection, 
and the seller would have less. Using the letter of credit in the way 
that Mann describes, however, provides an intermediate solution that 
balances the verification and enforcement needs of buyer and seller. 
Furthermore, the very feature than Mann highlights - the fact that 
documentary conditions are set strictly as a matter of legal formality, 
but waived liberally in ordinary practice - may be the key that 
enables the device to motivate performance on both sides. 
In order to see how this could be possible, consider the following 
alternate account of letters of credit, based on a set of admittedly 
stylized but empirically plausible assumptions. The first assumption is 
that in the period leading up to contractual performance, both the 
buyer and the seller receive some information that gives them some 
indication whether the other side is likely to perform. This 
information comes from a variety of communications and signals -
exchange of preliminary documents such as specifications, 
conversations between agents, requests for modification, third-party 
market reports, and the like. The parties regard the information as 
reliable in that they have reason to think it accurate, but it is soft 
information, not of the sort that can be corroborated with reasonable 
cost or accuracy by a third-party enforcer such as a court or arbitrator. 
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In the terminology of the modem economic literature on incomplete 
contracting, then, the information is observable but not verifiable.20 
Because a court cannot verify the information, the parties cannot 
directly condition their legal obligations on it, whether in a letter of 
credit or otherwise. Because the parties can observe such information 
on their own, however, there is no reason they cannot condition their 
actual behavior on it. In particular, the seller's decision whether to 
submit documents that conform to the conditions of a letter of credit, 
and the buyer's decision whether to waive any nonconformities, can 
depend on such soft information. 
Second, suppose that there is a variety of concrete actions that the 
parties can take that are correlated with, but not equivalent to, 
substantive contractual performance. This category would include the 
preparation of invoices and packing lists, procurement of inspection 
certificates and bills of lading, and so on. Because such actions are 
costly, both parties would prefer to avoid or minimize them if this can 
be done without putting at risk the underlying exchange. On the other 
hand, because of their relative concreteness and formality, such 
actions are both observable and verifiable by third-party enforcers at 
low cost. Thus, in contrast to the soft information described 
previously, they are contractible - that is, they can be used to 
condition legally enforceable obligations and can form the basis for 
the documentary terms of a letter of credit. 
Under these assumptions, a seller who has sent signals of reliability 
to a buyer through informal channels does not need to concern herself 
as much with strict formal compliance with the documentary terms of 
a letter of credit. Because the buyer can tell that performance is likely 
to be forthcoming notwithstanding any documentary discrepancies, he 
is more likely to waive such discrepancies when they occur. The seller, 
anticipating such waiver, can thus save on the costs of formal 
documentation, complying substantially but not strictly. 
Conversely, a seller whose underlying performance has been 
deficient will face greater difficulties obtaining payment, just because a 
buyer who has received signals of the deficiency through informal 
channels will be less likely to waive any documentary defects. A seller 
who anticipates such difficulties, of course, can protect herself by 
going to greater efforts to ensure that she has strictly complied with all 
the documentary conditions; for instance, the seller could engage a 
commercial specialist, such as a confirming bank, to check her 
documents to make sure they are free of error. Such protection, 
however, comes at a cost, for as Mann's informal survey indicates, 
banks charge for such a service. 
20. See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND TIIB LAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
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Given this framework, the costs of strict documentary compliance, 
combined with the threat that the buyer will refuse to waive formal 
defects and the seller will be forced to collect through an expensive 
legal proceeding, reinforce the seller's incentive to perform the 
underlying contract substantively. Substantive performance of the 
underlying contract, of course, is what the buyer is really interested in, 
not documentary compliance per se. But the potential enforcement of 
the documentary conditions, which are cheaply verifiable by a third 
party, operates as a substitute for enforcement of substantive 
performance, which is expensive for a third party to verify. The fact 
that enforcement of the documentary conditions is rare - in most 
instances they operate as an out-of-equilibrium threat - makes them 
even cheaper to enforce. 
In order for this device to work, however, the seller must be 
assured that if she does perform substantively, the buyer will not seize 
on documentary noncompliance as an excuse not to pay. For if the 
seller lacks such assurance, she will need to undertake the expense of 
strict compliance to guard against such buyer opportunism, in which 
case the prospect of saving on document expenses can no longer 
operate as a reward for substantive performance. And this is where 
the issuing bank comes into the picture: as a monitor who supervises 
the buyer to ensure that he does not opportunistically enforce the 
documentary terms in situations where there has been no defect in the 
underlying substantive performance. 
Note the distinction between the bank's role in this account of 
letters of credit, and the bank's role in Mann's account. Under my 
account, the bank's verification role is more limited than Mann 
indicates. The bank does not provide any general verification of the 
buyer's financial condition or commercial reliability. Rather, it 
provides the more specific verification that the buyer will honor the 
implicit bargain under which the documentary conditions are waived 
whenever there is no apparent substantive defect. 
Second and similarly, the bank's incentives to perform this task are 
sharper than in Mann's account. Under his story, in contrast, the 
bank's incentive is purely reputational; if the buyer does not pay, 
future sellers 'vill assume that the bank's client base is less financially 
reliable. Under my story, there is also a reputational incentive, but 
there is a legal incentive too, since the seller always retains the option 
of submitting complying documents. In most cases she will not wish to 
exercise this option, of course, since she can obtain payment without 
going to such expense. But if the buyer is operating in bad faith or is 
otherwise planning to breach the underlying contract, the seller will 
likely receive some advance signal of this fact and will make greater 
efforts to submit complying documents. The threat that the seller will 
actually comply with the letter of credit, thus placing the bank legally 
August 2000] Bilateral Assurance 2567 
on the hook, gives the bank an incentive both to monitor the buyer for 
substantive compliance ex post, as well as to screen the buyer ex ante. 
Moreover, the bank's reputational incentives are themselves more 
focused than Mann's account would suggest. According to his 
account, the market treats nonpayment of a letter of credit as a signal 
of general financial risk; because future sellers will regard the buyer 
(and the bank's client base more generally) as more likely to default 
on their contractual obligations, they will avoid dealing with this bank 
and buyer in the future or will insist on a larger risk premium in 
exchange for doing so. But as I have argued above, such a signal is 
weak. Lacking information about the specific transaction, the market 
will not be able easily to distinguish between cases in which there is 
actual breach and cases in which there is not, or between substantive 
risk and all the other reasons that might explain the rejection of a 
documentary presentation. Under my account, however, such 
distinctions need not be drawn, since the rejection of a substantially 
complying presentation is undesirable in itself. With each such 
rejection, the market will increasingly regard the bank as a stickler for 
details, and as having a client base made up of similar sticklers for 
detail. Future sellers will thus anticipate that if they take letters of 
credit from this buyer or bank, they will have to undertake additional 
costs of documentary compliance. This anticipated cost increase, then, 
will lead sellers to raise their price in a corresponding amount when 
dealing with the bank's future applicants on a letter-of-credit basis; 
and this will reduce the amount that applicants are willing to pay for a 
letter of credit in the first place. 
The letter of credit thus operates as a bilateral formal enforcement 
device that in most cases does not need to be used. When the soft 
information coming through informal channels indicates that the 
parties will perform adequately, the seller can afford to cut comers on 
documentary compliance and the buyer can afford to waive the 
resultant defects. When the soft information indicates the possibility 
of breach, however, both parties will want to behave in a more 
legalistic fashion. But since the vast majority of contracts are 
performed rather than breached, the insistence on formalities is the 
relatively rare event. 
This bilateral enforcement model offered above, if accurate, thus 
explains why the parties choose letters of credit, why the parties 
routinely choose formal conditions that are stricter than they plan to 
insist on in practice, why almost all letters of credit are paid 
not\vithstanding their technical noncompliance with documentary 
terms, and why letters of credit are priced in proportion to their face 
value. The parties choose letters of credit because, unlike an ordinary 
credit reference, they motivate the seller's substantive performance as 
well as the buyer's. They choose formal conditions stricter than they 
plan to enforce in practice so that the costs of formal compliance, 
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together with the buyer's discretion to refuse payment when the 
formal conditions are not met, reinforce the seller's incentives to 
perform substantively. Most letters of credit are paid in practice 
because most of the underlying substantive contracts are performed 
according to the buyer's expectation - that is, the device is effective. 
And letters of credit are priced according to their face value because, 
in most cases, the issuing bank is actually called upon to pay; thus, its 
expected costs of float and default risk are, in equilibrium, roughly 
proportional to the size of the credit.21 
Note that my story fits reasonably well with the specific data Mann 
uncovers relating to the nature of discrepancy and waiver. There is no 
indication in his data that buyers are willing to waive documentary 
discrepancies in cases where there has been substantive contractual 
breach. Almost 60% of the defects he identifies involve technical 
defects that have little to do with the underlying bargain, and of the 
28% that he classifies as substantive, over half consist of late or short 
shipment, which may not be a breach at all from either the legal or the 
practical viewpoint.22 
Note further that this bilateral enforcement model comports with 
the traditional scholarly· account of the letter of credit that Mann 
claims to rebut. According to Mann, the traditional explanation 
"hinges on the seller's having a reliable and assured right to payment" 
from the issuing bank; whereas in fact most sellers submit defective 
documents and hence have "no right to payment at all. "23 But here 
Mann is confusing the existence of a right with its exercise. Because 
the seller retains the option to present formally complying documents, 
she does ultimately have the legal right to compel payment. Because 
of the effectiveness of the informal channels of information and 
nonlegal enforcement, she usually chooses not to go to the trouble of 
establishing the preconditions of legal enforcement. But in this regard 
she is no different than many if not most contracting parties who 
choose to enter into legally binding arrangements. 
The way in which waiver operates in the letter-of-credit setting, 
indeed, exemplifies its role in contractual relations and contract law 
21. The administrative costs of processing payment admittedly do not vary with the size 
of the credit, but these processing costs may be small. In addition, reputational costs could 
either be fixed or variable, but, in equilibrium, reputational costs don't need to be paid. 
22. Under both U.C.C. Article 2 and the U.N. Convention for the International Sale of 
Goods ("CISG"), quantity and delivery terms are supplemented by trade usage, course of 
dealing, course of performance, and any obligations arising out of the commercial principle 
of good faith. Under the CISG, parol evidence and other precontractual communications 
also enter into the bargain. Thus the seller's actual duty to ship under the contract may be 
quite different from that indicated in the letter of credit or other written documents. More 
importantly, even if the buyer has the technical legal right to reject the goods or claim 
damages for a nonconfomiing shipment, they may be perfectly adequate to his needs as a 
practical matter, especially after a price adjustment. 
23. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2496. 
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generally. Lisa Bernstein has argued, for instance, that contracting 
parties routinely place legal conditions in their agreements that they 
fully expect to waive.24 This is not because they value compliance with 
such conditions in itself, but because the threat value of the conditions 
helps economize on the costs of contract enforcement. In Bernstein's 
view, the formal conditions are not intended to govern the parties' 
effective rights and duties in the context of a successful ongoing 
relationship. Rather, they are "endgame" norms to be invoked only in 
the event that the relationship breaks down.25 Similarly, Robert Scott 
has argued that repossession, acceleration clauses, and other 
supposedly coercive provisions in debtor-creditor contracts are best 
understood as formal threats that serve to economize on monitoring 
and enforcement of the debtor's obligations, and that in most cases are 
not intended to be carried out.26 Benjamin Klein and Richard Epstein 
have defended traditional at-will termination provisions in franchise 
and employment contracts on analogous grounds.27 
It is an essential part of all these authors' accounts that such formal 
conditions be maintained as part of the parties' legally enforceable 
obligations, and not be watered down by doctrines such as waiver, 
good faith, or course of performance. Otherwise they will lose their 
threat value, and their resultant ability to support the parties' implicit 
relational expectations. Under the modern American law of contracts, 
however, the enforceability of such conditions has generally been 
eroding in just this fashion over the course of past decades.28 Indeed, 
Bernstein has argued that the failure of courts to enforce strict 
compliance has been a major factor in the decision of private 
commercial actors to opt out of public enforcement and into private 
enforcement systems that do not recognize or substantially cut back on 
antiformalist doctrines such as waiver. As the earlier discussion has 
made clear, however, such incursions on strict compliance have for the 
most part been kept out of the law of letters of credit. 
The more conventional wisdom of the scholarly literature on 
contracts, of course, is that the duty of good faith and similar 
restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of strict compliance are 
24. See Lisa Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law: The Questionable Empirical 
Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 
(1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law]. 
25. See id. at 766. 
26. See Scott, Coercive Creditor Remedies, supra note 8. 
27. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 
956-76 (1984); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of 'Unfair' Contractual 
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 356 (1980). 
28. See, e.g., Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law, supra note 24; Robert Scott, The 
Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code 
Methodologies, in JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMMERCIAL LAW (J. Kraus and 
S. Walt eds.) (forthcoming 2000). 
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necessary to prevent opportunism on the part of the party with the 
discretion and to encourage relational investment on the part of the 
party who is vulnerable. In the franchise context, for instance, Gillian 
Hadfield has argued that the doctrine of good faith is an essential limit 
on the franchisor's right to terminate the franchise contract at will; else 
franchisors will be able to expropriate franchisee investments and 
extort one-sided modifications to the franchise contract.29 Stewart 
Schwab has similarly argued in the employment context that limits on 
at-will termination are necessary to protect employees' expectations 
and induce them to invest in human capital.30 
If Mann's reputational story (as modified according to my 
proposed amendments) is correct, furthermore, then it also makes 
sense that the legal doctrine of strict compliance should be applied 
more formally in letter-of-credit law than in contract law generally. 
Such a distinction is sensible because in the letter-of-credit context, 
there is a credible reputational intermediary - the issuing bank -
that has the ability and incentive to police the buyer-applicant so that 
he doesn't exercise his discretion opportunistically. In the ordinary 
two-party context, in contrast, such assurance is harder to find; it must 
come from the reputational interests of the party vested with 
discretion (as in Klein, Scott, and Epstein's account) or from the 
community of traders generally (as in Bernstein's). 
4. LOOKING MORE CLOSELY AT THE DATA 
In order for my revision of Mann's story to be more than a mere 
theoretical hypothesis, of course, it needs to be backed up by the data. 
In this regard, it is useful to identify the empirical predictions that my 
revision generates. If I am right, then we should expect to see letters 
of credit enforced strictly not just when the buyer's performance is 
uncertain, but also when seller performance is uncertain, when it is 
relatively costly to enforce the underlying substantive contractual 
arrangements, when other commitment devices are unavailable or 
uneconomical, and when the issuing bank's reputation is relatively 
weak. Similarly, we should expect to see high rates of noncompliance 
with formal conditions (and high rates of waiver) not just when buyer 
performance is relatively reliable, but also when seller performance is 
relatively reliable, when sellers have low-cost alternatives to 
contractual enforcement, and when the issuing bank's reputation is 
relatively strong. 
29. See Gillian Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete 
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990) 
30. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and 
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993). 
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Mann's data, as reported, are not rich enough to test all of these 
hypotheses simultaneously, let alone determine their relative 
importance. Because he looks only at bank records and at letter-of­
credit transactions in particular, his data cannot tell us what factors 
systematically influence buyers and sellers to use letters of credit as 
opposed to other contractual assurance devices. To answer that 
question, it would be necessary to collect similarly detailed 
information about buyers and sellers using other devices. 
Furthermore, because his information about individual buyers and 
sellers is limited to a few variables, and because his sample of banks is 
too small for him to consider bank characteristics as possible 
explanatory variables, it does not tell us much about the transactional 
factors that determine the risk of opportunism, and hence the rate of 
compliance and waiver. Some of the material that he recounts from 
his qualitative interviews, to be sure, is quite suggestive in this respect. 
For instance, the hypothesis that opportunism is more likely in 
contracts for the sale of commodities than in contracts for finished 
goods, because markets for the former are typically characterized by 
greater price fluctuations, is entirely plausible.31 Similar hypotheses 
could be put forward regarding the specialized or nonspecialized 
nature of the goods, the thickness of the market to which they are 
being shipped, or their perishability. But, unfortunately, Mann's 
statistical analysis does not distinguish among transactions involving 
different types of goods, even though he states that he collected data 
on the type of good being traded.32 
Mann does divide his sample into import and export transactions, 
and calculates the rate of discrepancy and waiver for each. But this 
single variable, however, is not sufficient to allow us to distinguish 
among the various possible explanations discussed above. Mann 
suggests, for instance, that the relatively high rate of discrepancies on 
letters of credit associated with shipments coming into the United 
States is due to the relative reliability of American compared with 
foreign buyers.33 But the difference could also be attributable to the 
greater reliability of foreign sellers, the stronger commercial 
reputations of U.S. banks, or the greater sophistication of U.S. buyers 
or foreign sellers in collecting and assessing the soft information that 
allows the parties to save on the costs of strict formal compliance. The 
evidence is thus overdetermined; in order to identify the relative 
importance of these various hypotheses, we need more variables and a 
method of statistical analysis (such as multiple regression), that allows 
us to consider the separate effect of each variable on the data. 
31. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2511. 
32 See id. at 2497. 
33. See id. at 2509. 
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One obvious possibility would be to distinguish not just between 
import and export transactions, but between transactions going into 
and coming out of different countries. Mann indicates that his data set 
includes the country of origin and shipment for each contract; it would 
be a reasonably straightforward matter to divide the sample into 
developed and less developed countries, capitalist and command 
economies, or countries with well-established legal systems and 
countries in transition. Such classifications would require some 
amount of subjective judgment, but the categories would not have to 
be perfect to be useful, and a variety of proxies such as OECD or 
WTO are available. Depending on how many countries were 
involved, the sample size of 500 might even be large enough to permit 
the use of individual country dummy variables \vithout sacrificing 
overall statistical significance. But given the number of possible 
theoretical explanations, a more detailed statistical analysis is in order, 
appears possible on the existing data set, and would appear to promise 
substantial additional insight. 
Going beyond Mann's current study, it would be desirable to 
collect similar information from a larger number of issuing banks, so 
that individual bank characteristics could be added into the statistical 
analysis. Mann's qualitative interviews did reveal some differences in 
bank policy; for example, his midwestem bank appeared to be more 
formalistic in reviewing letters of credit, and less interventionist in 
pressuring its applicants to waive defects, than were the other regional 
and national banks he surveyed. This difference, if accurate, could be 
attributable to the midwestem bank's customer base or to the type of 
transactions it tended to finance. For instance, perhaps its letter-of­
credit business included a larger fraction of agricultural sales than 
other banks, and agricultural shipments are subject to a greater risk of 
opportunism than other sales contracts, perhaps due to the effects of 
weather and price fluctuations. On the other hand, it could also be the 
case that the bank, because of its relatively small size or more limited 
experience in financing letter-of-credit transactions, was less able to 
signal its reliability or evaluate soft information coming from abroad. 
With the current data set, one can do no better than Mann does in 
speculating based on individual anecdotes, but with a larger and more 
diverse sample, it would be possible to be more systematic. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Ronald Mann's information-verification theory of letters of credit 
is instructive, original, and important, but incomplete. It is incomplete 
in two respects. First, by focusing primarily on the seller's need to 
verify the buyer's reliability, he ignores the buyer's symmetric need to 
verify the seller's reliability. Second and more subtly, he presents the 
need for verification as an alternate and mutually exclusive 
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explanation to the traditional account of letters ,of credit that 
emphasizes payment assurance, and thus he fails to recognize how 
verification and payment assurance operate in practice as 
complements rather than substitutes. More precisely, the fact that 
letters of credit are usually presented with documentary deficiencies 
that would preclude their legal enforcement does not mean that legal 
enforceability is not an important part of their commercial value. 
Rather, the threat of such enforceability is what provides the bank 
with the incentive to carry out its verification task credibly and 
cheaply, and conversely, the possibility of verification is what permits 
the parties to avoid in most instances the costs of actually carrying out 
that threat. 
At least as important as Mann's theoretical contribution, however, 
is the empirical information he has unearthed. His study shows 
convincingly that the traditional payment-assurance account of letters 
of credit is inadequate; whatever one makes of his conclusions, the 
survey and transactional data he has collected substantially enrich our 
understanding of this commercial device and of the markets in which it 
is used. It is now up to commercial law scholars more generally to 
build on this groundwork, to develop more sophisticated accounts of 
letters of credit and similar contractual arrangements, and, following 
his example, to find ways to test those accounts against the data. 
